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I. Introduction
The articles in this issue are the product of the first academic symposium
hosted by New York Law School’s Center on Business Law & Policy.  Founded
in 2005, the center’s activities highlight the current dynamism in the field of
corporate governance and the vital, changing relationship between business, gov-
ernment, and the economy.  Titled, Corporate Governance Five Years after
Sarbanes-Oxley: Is There Real Change?, the symposium provided a lively fo-
rum for debating the effects of recent law reforms affecting public companies’
governance structures, reporting obligations, systems of internal controls, and ac-
countability for misconduct.
Scholars on the first panel examined the influence of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act
of 2002 (“Sarbanes-Oxley” or “the Act”) from a socio-economic perspective.  As
Professor James Fanto’s article describes, Sarbanes-Oxley exemplifies the aspira-
tional mode in federal securities law—the spirit that motivated Congress to enact
laws that would promote “honest” markets, “full and fair disclosure,” and “high
standards of business ethics in the securities industry.”1  And yet the Act remains
highly controversial—a lightning rod for disagreement—because in Sarbanes-
Oxley, Congress chose to codify what had previously been mostly looser, nonbind-
ing standards and incorporated these objective, more rigorous standards into
mandatory federal laws and rules.  Furthermore, Congress exercised its jurisdic-
tional authority quite broadly in the Act; its new standards speak to public com-
pany auditors, accounting firms, corporate counsel,2 audit committees, senior
executives, and corporate whistleblowers.  As Professor Fanto’s article states, cur-
rent popular sentiment evidences profound skepticism toward the motivations of
politicians and government, hence the law’s ability to influence institutions, espe-
cially economically-oriented institutions, for the better.  As our panelists’ discus-
sion demonstrated, Professor Fanto’s article illuminates, and I have argued
1. See, e.g., SEC v. Zandford, 535 U.S. 813, 819 (2002) (“Among Congress’ objectives in passing the Act
was to insure honest securities markets and thereby promote investor confidence after the market crash of
1929 . . . . Congress sought to substitute philosophy of full disclosure for the philosophy of caveat emptor
and thus to achieve a high standard of business ethics in the industry.”) (internal quotations omitted);
Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 230, 234 (1987) (“There cannot be honest markets without honest
publicity . . . .  We have recognized time and time again, a fundamental purpose of the various securities
acts, was to substitute a philosophy of full disclosure for the philosophy of caveat emptor and thus to
achieve a high standard of business ethics in the securities industry.”) (internal quotations omitted); SEC
v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, 375 U.S. 180, 186 (1963) (“A fundamental purpose, common to these
statutes, was to substitute a philosophy of full disclosure for the philosophy of caveat emptor and thus to
achieve a high standard of business ethics in the securities industry.”).
2. For a discussion of the significance of the new Sarbanes-Oxley-inspired rules and standards governing
corporate counsels’ appropriate responses to signs of illegality, see Peter Kostant, From Lapdog to
Watchdog: Sarbanes-Oxley Section 307 and a New Role for Corporate Lawyers, 52 N.Y.L. SCH. L.
REV. 535 (2008).
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elsewhere,3 there is a deep meta-politics underlying the legal and economic criti-
cisms of Sarbanes-Oxley.4
In terms of substance, the first panel focused especially on provisions of the
Act pertaining to public companies’ boards.  Reflecting this discussion, Professor
Lawrence Lederman’s article discusses the Walt Disney Company (“Disney”) liti-
gation involving Michael Eisner’s hiring and firing of Michael Ovitz, and the
Disney board’s approval of the stunning compensation package awarded to
Ovitz.  As Professor Lederman describes, neither the litigants nor the court paid
much attention to the chief executive officer (“CEO”) succession issues that under-
lay the compensation dispute.5  This was true despite the fact that CEO succes-
sion planning is accepted as a signal responsibility of corporate directors.6
Although the Delaware Supreme Court exonerated the Disney board from liabil-
ity for breach of fiduciary duty, Professor Lederman astutely proposes that the
litigation might have taken a different turn if the plaintiffs had emphasized the
board’s abdication of its responsibilities for overseeing CEO succession—its fail-
ure to wrest control over succession planning from the company’s obviously self-
interested, current chief executive.
The second panel focused on the legal regulation of executive compensa-
tion—in particular, the extraordinarily large executive pay packages that
continue to be announced even by firms that are in financial difficulty.7  Because
3. Faith Stevelman Kahn, Bombing Markets, Subverting the Rule of Law: Enron, Financial Fraud,
and September 11, 2001, 76 TUL. L. REV. 1579 (2002) (describing how the Act reflects the pressure
being brought to bear on the legitimacy of secular, market institutions, and democratic values).
4. James Fanto, A Social Defense of Sarbanes-Oxley, 52 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 517, 522–25 (2008).
5. Lawrence Lederman, Disney Examined: A Case Study in Corporate Governance and CEO Succes-
sion,  52 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 557, 569–81 (2008).
6. See A.B.A., CORPORATE DIRECTOR’S GUIDEBOOK § 2 (3d ed. 2001) [hereinafter CORPORATE DIREC-
TOR’S GUIDEBOOK]; see also William Ocasio, Institutionalized Action and Corporate Governance:
The Reliance on Rules of CEO Succession, 384 ADMIN. SCI. Q. 44 (1999).
7. See Mozilo to Slice his Own Pay, Fees; Countrywide’s Chief Executive is Expected to Forfeit $37.5
Million, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 28, 2008, at A12; James R. Hagerty & Joann S. Lublin, Countrywide Direc-
tors’ Dilemma, WALL ST. J., Nov. 3–4, 2007, at B1; Rachel Sams, Norris Retires as W.R. Grace CEO
with $9 Million Payout, BALTIMORE BUS. J., Mar. 17, 2006, available at http://balti-
more.bizjournals.com/baltimore/stories/2006/03/20/story6.html; Liam Pleven & Susanne Craig, Deal
Fees Under Fire Amid Mortgage Crisis - - - Guaranteed Rewards of Bankers, Middlemen are in
the Spotlight, WALL ST. J., Jan. 17, 2008, at A1 (“Merrill Lynch & Co.’s former chief executive, Stan
O’Neal, left in October after the firm’s $8.4 billion write-down.  He didn’t get a bonus or severance, but
he retained $161.5 million in previously earned benefits and compensation because he met the age and
service requirement for collecting those benefits.  Charles Prince, Citigroup Inc.’s former CEO, lost his job,
too.  He left Citigroup in November with stock and other compensation valued at the time at $29.5
million, as well as a bonus.  He didn’t get severance.  Tuesday, Citigroup reported a fourth-quarter loss of
$9.83 billion.”); see also Louis Uchitelle, Revising a Boardroom Legacy, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 28, 2007, at
C1; Eduardo Porter, More Than Ever, It Pays to Be the Top Executive, N.Y. TIMES, May 25, 2007,
at A1; MAJORITY STAFF OF COMM. ON OVERSIGHT AND GOV’T REFORM, 110TH CONG., EXECUTIVE
PAY: CONFLICTS OF INTEREST AMONG COMPENSATION CONSULTANTS (2007) (prepared for Chairman
Henry A. Waxman), available at http://oversight.house.gov/documents/20071205100928.pdf.
477
\\server05\productn\N\NLR\52-4\NLR407.txt unknown Seq: 6 17-APR-08 12:18
FOREWORD
the Act addresses excessive executive compensation only tangentially, it has left
the door open for further law reform.  But choosing among law reforms in the
area of executive compensation involves selecting among policy goals, as Professor
Brett H. McDonnell’s article explores.  The corporate legal academy has been
indecisive about corporate law’s appropriate role in addressing growing income
inequality.8  Federal securities laws and corporate laws, respectively, allow dis-
closure and internal approval mechanisms to suffice as checks on excessive execu-
tive compensation.  Yet Professor McDonnell concludes that corporate legal
scholars “do not have a good basis” for dismissing the fact that income inequality
has been exacerbated by sky-high executive pay.9
Also included in this issue are the insightful remarks of our keynote speaker,
Delaware Supreme Court Chief Justice Myron T. Steele.  The chief justice ex-
presses concern about the increasingly porous boundary between state and federal
laws affecting companies’ governance structures and reporting duties.10  As he
notes, since Sarbanes-Oxley, federal securities law has increasingly influenced
state corporate laws’ traditional domain of internal corporate affairs.11  And Del-
aware corporate law has become more “activist” in employing fiduciary law to
setting standards for companies’ disclosures.12  As is evident in his remarks, Chief
Justice Steele is concerned that the increased overlap between federal and state
standards is creating legal uncertainty that will decrease shareholder wealth.13
The third panel focused on developments in accounting, auditing, and corpo-
rate disclosure—subjects at the heart of Sarbanes-Oxley.  In this area, the cumu-
lative effects of the Act’s provisions are only just becoming apparent.  Indeed,
shortly after our symposium, the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board
(“PCAOB”) brought its first enforcement action—an action in which it censured
Deloitte & Touche, LLP for its failed audit of Ligand Pharmaceuticals
Incorporated.14
8. Brett H. McDonnell, Two Goals for Executive Compensation Reform, 52 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 585
(2008).
9. Id. at 586.
10. Chief Justice Myron T. Steele, Sarbanes-Oxley: The Delaware Perspective, 52 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV.
503 (2008).
11. Id. at 506–07.
12. For a recent Delaware Chancery Court decision mandating firms’ disclosure of analysis underlying fair-
ness opinions, see In re Netsmart Techs., Inc. S’holders Litig., 924 A.2d 171 (Del. Ch. 2007). See also In
re  Checkfree S’holder Corp. Litig., No. 3193-CC, 2007 Del. Ch. LEXIS 148, (Del. Ch. Oct. 18, 2007)
(emphasizing the materiality of the information and analysis).
13. Steele, supra note 10 at 507.
14. In its disciplinary proceedings against Deloitte & Touche, LLP, the PCAOB obtained a civil monetary
penalty against the firm in the amount of $1 million and required it to commit to certain undertakings to
improve auditing quality and oversight. In re Deloitte & Touche, LLP, PCAOB Release No. 105-2007-
005 (Dec. 10, 2007).
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The fourth and final panel discussed recent trends in Securities and Ex-
change Commission (“SEC” or “Commission”) enforcement actions and Depart-
ment of Justice prosecutions of corporate frauds.15  Of special concern to the
speakers was the pressure being brought to bear on the attorney-client privilege
in internal corporate investigations spurred by criminal inquiries.16  In addition,
as highlighted in the article by Barry Rashkover and Laurin Blumenthal Klei-
man, there has been continuing concern about the potential for fraud by hedge
funds and their managers, and its potential to destabilize the markets.17
Decrying the costs imposed by recent regulations affecting public companies
and Wall Street firms, in early spring 2007, New York City Mayor Michael
Bloomberg and Senator Charles Schumer issued a report cautioning that these
new laws and regulations could undermine New York City’s financial prosper-
ity.18  But the symposium, held on April 13, 2007, coincided with an exciting,
upbeat moment in New York Law School’s history—in pauses between speakers,
we watched giant cranes hoisting into place the foundations of our new building.
II. Recent Developments in Corporate Governance and the Capital Markets
The magnitude and pace of corporate and securities law reform has acceler-
ated appreciably since Sarbanes-Oxley’s enactment.  The Act was passed in the
aftermath of the burst technology stock bubble, after years of concern over earn-
ings management,19 and just months after the frauds at Enron and WorldCom
culminated in the largest bankruptcy filings in U.S. history.20  Nevertheless,
when President George W. Bush signed Sarbanes-Oxley into law on July 30,
2002,21 controversy over the wisdom of the legislation and the costs it would
15. See, e.g., Preet Bharara, Corporations Cry Uncle and Their Employees Cry Foul: Rethinking
Prosecutorial Pressure on Corporate Defendants, 44 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 53 (2007).
16. See, e.g., Lisa Kern Griffin, Compelled Cooperation and the New Corporate Criminal Procedure,
82 N.Y.U. L. REV. 311, 319-21 (2007) (discussing factors for assessing corporate cooperation and hence
the likelihood and severity of criminal sanctions against corporate defendants).
17. Barry Rashkover & Laurin B. Kleiman, SEC Enforcement and Examinations Concerning Hedge
Funds, 52 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 599 (2008); see also Hedge Funds: In Need of International Regula-
tion?, Int’L Rev. (N.Y. L. Sch. Ctr. for Int’l Law, New York, N.Y.), Fall 2007, at 3.
18. SUSTAINING NEW YORK’S AND THE U.S.’ GLOBAL FINANCIAL SERVICES LEADERSHIP (2007) [hereinafter
SUSTAINING FINANCIAL SERVICES LEADERSHIP] (commissioned by New York City Mayor Michael R.
Bloomberg and Senator Charles E. Schumer), available at http://www.senate.gov/~schumer/
SchumerWebsite/pressroom/special_reports/2007/NY_REPORT%20_FINAL.pdf.
19. For a famous statement expressing such concern, see Arthur Levitt, The “Numbers Game,” Remarks at the
New York University Center for Law and Business (Sept. 28, 1998), available at www.sec.gov/news/
speech/speecharchive/1998/spch220.txt.
20. In re Enron Corp., No. 01-16034, 2001 Bankr. LEXIS 1563 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Dec. 3, 2001); In re
WorldCom, Inc., No. 02-13533, 2003 Bankr. LEXIS 2192 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. May 16, 2003).
21. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (codified in scattered sections of 11, 15,
18, 28 and 29 U.S.C.); see also George W. Bush, U.S. President, President Bush Signs Corporate
Corruption Bill (July 30, 2002), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/07/20020
479
\\server05\productn\N\NLR\52-4\NLR407.txt unknown Seq: 8 17-APR-08 12:18
FOREWORD
impose on public companies and their advisers erupted almost immediately.  And
this controversy has continued to the present.22
The past five years have been exciting but also confusing for corporate legal
scholars and those who follow the regulation of public companies and the capital
markets.23  Since Sarbanes-Oxley’s enactment, there has been a steady outpour-
ing of new anti-corruption, “increased accountability” laws, SEC regulations,
and listing standards—consistent with Congress’s mandate.24  Notwithstanding
the massive financial fraud currently enveloping Refco Inc.,25 fewer large scale
corporate accounting frauds have been reported in the past few years.  However,
the scope and variety of other kinds of financial frauds and schemes remains
shocking.  As of December 2007, the Wall Street Journal had declared that the
economic ill effects of investor losses on mortgage-backed securities would equal
those arising from the savings and loan crisis of the 1980s,26 and SEC probes and
other investigations are ongoing.27  Ironically, a significant portion of these
losses, like those from the Enron era, relate to erroneous financial valuations,
730.html (“[T]oday I sign the most far-reaching reforms of American business practices [Sarbanes-Oxley]
since the time of Franklin Delano Roosevelt.”).
22. Corporate legal scholars are often harshly critical of corporate and securities legislation, noting the relative
rigidity and slow pace of statutory reform, the potentially questionable incentives of politicians and legis-
lators, and the difficulty of demonstrating the “efficiency” of legislative reforms based on compelling em-
pirical evidence.  For a scathing review of Sarbanes-Oxley along these lines, see Roberta Romano, The
Sarbanes-Oxley Act and the Making of Quack Corporate Governance, 114 YALE L. J. 1521, 1526-
28 (2005); Larry E. Ribstein, Sarbanes-Oxley After Three Years, 3 N.Z. L. REV. 365 (2005).  For a
more favorable account of Sarbanes-Oxley, including consideration of the empirical evidence, see Robert
A. Prentice & David B. Spence, Sarbanes-Oxley as Quack Corporate Governance: How Wise is the
Received Wisdom?, 95 GEO. L. J. 1843 (2007); John C. Coates IV, The Goals and Promise of the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act, 21 J. ECON. PERSP. 91 (2007).
23. For a discussion of the disparate popular opinions regarding Sarbanes-Oxley’s effects and the hurdles that
limit the reliability of empirical proofs of its effects, see Sarbanes-Oxley, Five Years Under the Thumb,
ECONOMIST, July 26, 2007, available at http://www.economist.com/displaystory.cfm?story_id=9545905.
24. See, e.g., Robert Charles Clark, Corporate Governance Changes in the Wake of the Sarbanes-Oxley
Act: A Morality Tale for Policymakers Too, 22 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 251 (2005) (presenting a synthetic
overview of Sarbanes-Oxley-inspired reforms and recent empirical analyses of their costs and impacts);
Jeffrey N. Gordon, Governance Failures of the Enron Board and the New Information Order of
Sarbanes-Oxley, 35 CONN. L. REV. 1125, 1127 (2003) (“The sum total may portend the most far-
reaching changes in American corporate governance since the original 1930s securities acts.”).
25. For reference to the criminal indictment of the company’s senior executives, including its general counsel,
see, for example, Refco Ex-Finance Chief Pleads Guilty, WALL ST. J., Feb. 21, 2008, at C3.
26. Greg Ip, Mark Whitehouse & Aaron Lucchetti, U.S. Mortgage Crisis Rivals S&L Meltdown — Toll
of Economic Shocks May Linger for Years; A Global Credit Crunch, WALL ST. J., Dec. 10, 2007, at
A1.
27. See, e.g., Susan Pulliam & Kara Scannell, Pricing Probes on Wall Street Gather Steam, WALL ST. J.,
Dec. 21, 2007, at C1 (“Regulatory investigations into mortgage-securities pricing are examining whether
financial firms should have told the public earlier about the declining value of such securities and how they
priced them on their books, people close to the matter say.”).
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faulty record keeping, and inflated credit ratings.28  Easy and cheap credit tied to
the promise of ever rising real estate values appears to have done to the later-
2000s what speculation in technology stocks did for the 1990s.  In both periods the
mechanisms of market efficiency overloaded, despite what seemed to be robust
legal controls.
Putting aside the large-scale financial accounting and corporate looting
scandals from Enron to Refco29 in order to survey the financial landscape more
broadly, the years after Sarbanes-Oxley’s enactment have brought to light ongo-
ing cheating by New York Stock Exchange (“NYSE”) floor specialists,30 illicit
investor trading in mutual funds,31 systematic bias in equity analysts’ reports,32
28. See, e.g., Susan Pulliam, Merrill’s Deals With Hedge Funds May Have Delayed Day of Reckoning,
WALL ST. J., Nov. 2, 2007, at A1 (“The SEC is looking into how the Wall Street firm [Merrill] has been
valuing, or ‘marking’ its mortgage securities and how it has disclosed its positions to investors, a person
familiar with the probe said.”); see also Michael Siconolfi, Did Authorities Miss a Chance To Ease
Crunch? — SEC, Spitzer Probed Bear CDO Pricing in ’05, Before Backing Away, WALL ST. J.,
Dec. 10, 2007, at C1 (“Financial firms have disclosed write-downs totaling more than $40 billion this
year involving mortgage-related assets, partly stemming from mark-downs following cuts in the credit
ratings of complex securities known as collateralized debt obligations. The SEC in recent months opened
broad, new investigations into whether a number of financial firms are properly valuing such
investments.”).
29. In the past several years, major financial accounting or looting/self-dealing scandals have occurred at, for
example, Adelphia Communications, Inc., AOL-Time Warner, Bristol Myers Squib, Computer Associates,
Dynegy, Enron, Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, Global Crossing, Halliburton, HealthSouth, ImClone,
Kmart, Lucent, Parmalat, Qwest, Refco, Rite Aid, Tyco, WorldCom, and Xerox.  For a factual discussion,
see Press Release, Dep’t of Justice, Fact Sheet: President’s Corporate Fraud Task Force Marks Five Years
of Ensuring Corporate Integrity (July 17, 2007), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/opa/pr/2007/July/
07_odag_507.html. See also Penelope Patsuris, The Corporate Scandal Sheet, FORBES, Aug. 26,
2002, available at http://www.forbes.com/2002/07/25/accountingtracker.html.  For socio-legal commen-
tary, see John C. Coffee, What Caused Enron? A Capsule Social and Economic History of the 1990s,
89 CORNELL L. REV. 269, 271 (2004) (“[T]he explosion of financial irregularity in 2001 and 2002 was
the natural and logical consequence of trends and forces that had been developing for some time. Ironically,
the blunt truth is that recent accounting scandals and the broader phenomenon of earnings management
are by-products of a system of corporate governance that has indeed made corporate managers more ac-
countable to the market. Yet sensitivity to the market can be a mixed blessing, particularly when the
market becomes euphoric and uncritical.”).
30. For a discussion of the specialist scandal and its effects on the NYSE, see William G. Christie & Robert B.
Thompson, Wall Street Scandals: The Curative Effects of Law and Finance, 84 WASH. U. L. REV.
1567, 1577 (2006) (“In our view, markets failed to adequately police themselves due to the self-interests of
the market participants and their owner/regulators. The responsibility for resolving this anti-competitive
scenario, then, fell to the legal system rather than the markets. When entrenched interests are so deeply
grounded in their routines, and when market participants have little or no option to bypass these interests,
regulation and/or litigation can produce a value-enhancing outcome.”).
31. For an explanation of the causes and effects of late trading in mutual funds, see Christie & Thompson,
supra note 30, at 1586 (“The losses created by late trading are dispersed among each of the fund’s share-
holders, so that the loss of all but the largest of trades may be hidden in the background noise created by
other factors affecting value . . . .  The real control rests with the fund manager who has a contract with
the board to manage the fund.  These managers’ incentives to address these issues may be overridden by
relationships with others in the industry who benefit from late trading or stale prices.”).  See also Con-
ference–Mutual Fund & Investor Welfare, 1 J. BUS. & TECH. L. (INAUGURAL ISSUE) 1 (2006).
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and widespread stock options backdating.33  Credit rating agencies, which had
come under fire after Enron’s collapse,34 are once again under scrutiny from Con-
gress and the SEC.35  Headlines decrying Enron’s massive losses on off-balance
sheet liabilities tied to special purpose entities36 have given way to headlines
decrying even more massive investor losses on mortgage-backed security invest-
ments involving structured investment vehicles.37  These losses suggest that
32. For extensive information regarding the Global Research Analyst Settlement, see SEC, SPOTLIGHT ON
THE GLOBAL RESEARCH ANALYST SETTLEMENT, available at http://www.sec.gov/spotlight/globalsettle-
ment.htm (last visited Feb. 22, 2008). See also Press Release, Office of N.Y. State Attorney Gen. Eliot
Spitzer, SEC, NY Attorney General, NASD, NASAA, NYSE and State Regulators Announce Historic
Agreement to Reform Investment Practices (Dec. 20, 2002); Robert B. Ahdieh, Dialectical Regulation,
38 CONN. L. REV. 863, 885–86 (2006) (discussing the Global Research Analyst Settlement as an instance
of dialectical regulation); Jill E. Fisch, Regulatory Responses to Investor Irrationality: The Case of
the Research Analyst, 10 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 57 (2006).
33. See, e.g., Christopher Cox, Chairman, SEC, Address to the 2007 Corporate Counsel Institute (Mar. 8,
2007), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/2007/spch030807cc.htm (citing roughly one hundred
sixty backdating investigations as being ongoing and observing the essential role of inside counsel in
bringing wrongdoing  to the Commission’s attention); Before the U.S. Senate Committee on Banking,
Housing, and Urban Affairs, 109th Cong. (2006) (statements of  Erik Lie, Associate Professor of Fi-
nance, Henry B. Tippie College of Business, University of Iowa)  (setting forth empirical data evidencing
backdating), available at http://www.biz.uiowa.edu/faculty/elie/TestimonyErikLie.pdf.  On September
6, 2006, the Senate Finance Committee held hearings on the backdating of stock options and other contro-
versial features of executive compensation. See David I. Walker, Some Observations on the Stock
Option Backdating Scandal of 2006 (Boston Univ. Sch. of Law Working Paper No. 06-31, 2006)
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=929702; Justin Scheck & Steve Stecklow, Brocade Ex-CEO Gets
21 Months in Prison, WALL ST. J., Jan. 17, 2008, at A3 (“To date, 17 executives at eight companies
have been charged with criminal offenses relating to backdating.”).
34. Arthur R. Pinto, Control and Responsibility of Credit Rating Agencies in the United States, 54 AM.
J. COMP. L. 341, 349–51 (2006) (describing SEC’s regulatory responses to credit rating agencies’ failures
to respond to Enron’s genuine risk profile).
35. Aaron Lucchetti & Serena Ng, How Rating Agencies’ Firms’ Calls Fueled Subprime Mess, WALL ST.
J., Aug. 15, 2007, at A1 (“S&P, Moody’s Investors Service and Fitch Ratings gave top ratings to many
securities built on the questionable loans, making the securities seem as safe as a Treasury bond.”); Kara
Scannell & Deborah Solomon, Unraveling the Subprime Mess; Congress, Treasury Set to Review
Meltdown; Targeting Credit Raters, WALL ST. J., Sept. 4, 2007, at A6; Stephen Labaton, Debt-
Rating Agencies are Under Scrutiny by S.E.C., WALL ST. J., Sept. 27, 2007, at C4 (“At a hearing
before the Senate Banking Committee, the chairman, Christopher Cox, said the commission was examin-
ing whether the credit agencies had ‘compromised their impartiality’ when they simultaneously rated
various mortgage-backed securities and provided advice to Wall Street investment firms about how to
package them so as to gain higher credit ratings. The credit agencies also receive fees from the investment
firms.”).
36. For a superb discussion of Enron’s use of special purposes entities, see Steven L. Schwarcz, Enron and the
Use and Abuse of Special Purpose Entities in Corporate Structures, 70 U. CIN. L. REV. 1309, 1315
(2002) (noting that many of Enron’s special purpose entites, which supplied the company with needed
cash, were capitalized with Enron stock). See also William W. Bratton, Enron and the Dark Side of
Shareholder, 76 TUL. L. REV. 1275 (2002) (describing Enron’s extensive use of off-balance sheet financ-
ing and transgression of appropriate accounting standards).  Congress provided for specific reporting re-
quirements for off-balance sheet transactions in Section 401(a) of Sarbanes-Oxley. See 15 U.S.C. § 78m
(Supp. IV 2004).
37. See, e.g., Carrick Mollenkamp et al., How London Created A Snarl in Global Markets; SIVs Fueled
Debt Boom, But Now Banks Scramble to Prop up the Funds, WALL ST. J., Oct. 18, 2007, at A1
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structured finance continues to pose a fundamental challenge to the basic promise
of corporate financial transparency38—that is, the bedrock assumption that U.S.
investors will be able to make informed choices when they invest in the capital
markets.39
In sum, if Sarbanes-Oxley was intended to restore investor confidence in the
reliability of financial reporting systems in public companies listed in the United
States and the integrity of corporate and Wall Street executives, subsequent
events have vexed this promise and aspiration.  Despite Sarbanes-Oxley-in-
spired upgrades to the mandatory reporting system prescribed by the federal se-
curities laws,40 the Wall Street Journal recently made the worrisome,
(“Fears are rife that dozens of huge, structured investment vehicles, or SIVs, many of them affiliated with
banks, will be forced to unload billions of dollars of mortgage-backed securities and other assets. Such a fire
sale could cripple debt markets that play a crucial role in the global economy by providing financing for
everything from company payrolls to mortgage loans.”).
38. For official acknowledgment of the problem, see Press Release, SEC, SEC Chairman Cox Announces
Members of Advisory Committee on Improvements to Financial Reporting, (July 31, 2007), available at
http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2007/2007-154.htm.
As financial reporting has become more complex, many investors have expressed concerns
that it is often difficult to understand the financial reports of companies in which they
invest.  Likewise, companies have expressed concerns that it is difficult to ensure compliance
with U.S. GAAP and SEC reporting rules when preparing financial reports.  In fact, dur-
ing 2006, almost 10 percent of U.S. public companies had to restate prior financial reports
due to the discovery of errors in those reports.  Restatements are costly to companies, and
undermine the confidence of investors in the financial reporting system.
Id.  For academic commentary noting this fundamental dilemma, see Steven L. Schwarcz, Rethinking
the Disclosure Paradigm in a World of Complexity, 2004 U. ILL. L. REV. 1, 5–6 (using Enron as
exemplar to question whether concept of genuine financial transparency is illusory given financial com-
plexity in global corporate enterprises).
39. See, e.g., Eleanor Laise, Funds Struggle with Pricing Pitfalls, WALL ST. J., Sept. 17, 2007, at C1
(“Many funds are still struggling to find the best way to value their holdings. In a Deloitte & Touche
USA LLP survey released last month, 65% of fund firms said they had made changes in their valuation
policies in the past year. . . .  Valuation policies can vary substantially from fund to fund.”); Henry
Kaufman, Our Risky New Financial Markets, WALL ST. J., Aug. 15, 2007, at A13 (“These two devel-
opments — securitization and the seamless interconnectivity of markets — have brought intricate quanti-
tative risk modeling to the forefront of financial practices. . . .  Few recognize, however, that such
modeling assumes constancy in market fundamentals. This is because modeling does not adequately account
for underlying structural changes when attempting to calculate future risks and prices.”).  For a discussion
of asset securitization and its advantages for firms seeking to raise financing, see Steven L. Schwarcz,
The Alchemy of Asset Securitization, 1 STAN. J. L. BUS. & FIN. 133, 137 (1994).
40. Extensive commentary on the SEC’s ongoing program of enhancing mandatory reporting system for  pub-
lic companies is available on the SEC’s website at http://www.sec.gov/spotlight/sarbanes-oxley.htm.  For
an example of an upgrade to the reporting system, see Additional Form 8-K Disclosure Requirements and
Acceleration of Filing Date, Securities Act Release No. 8400, Exchange Act Release No. 49424, 2004 SEC
LEXIS 639, *6–7  (Mar. 16, 2004) (“Under the previous Form 8-K regime, companies were required to
report very few significant corporate events. . . .  The revisions that we adopt today will benefit markets
by increasing the number of unquestionably or presumptively material events that must be disclosed cur-
rently.  They will also provide investors with better and more timely disclosure of important corporate
events.”).  For commentary, see Frank B. Cross & Robert A. Prentice, The Economic Value of Securi-
ties Regulation, 28 CARDOZO L. REV. 333 (2006) (describing SEC’s mandatory reporting system and
concluding that its effects are beneficial to investors); Troy A. Paredes, After the Sarbanes-Oxley Act:
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remarkably far-reaching assertion that investors face “an age of murky pric-
ing.”41  And this murkier pricing persists despite the fact that public company
auditors, now under the watchful eye of the PCAOB,42 are credited with con-
ducting more independent, vigilant audits than they had in the 1990s.43  That
many of Wall Street’s largest, most prestigious financial firms are suffering
multi-billion dollar investment losses imports a special irony and heightened anx-
iety into the recent turmoil.  That is, if these powerful, sophisticated investment
houses cannot protect themselves from financial devastation, this does not bode
well for retail investors and the broader health of the U.S. capital markets.44
Also disturbing is the fact that in many instances, the senior executives of
these firms appear to have walked away from the devastation with handsome
compensation/severance packages.45  Hence, as was previously the case, their pay
packages continue only loosely to correlate with their firms’ financial performance
or genuine increases in shareholder value.46  Even the current, notoriously busi-
The Future of the Mandatory Disclosure System, Forward, 81 WASH. U. L. Q. 229 (2003) (analyzing
the post-Sarbanes-Oxley disclosure regime and describing the contemporary scholarly debate over required
disclosure).  For a comprehensive historical review of SEC-mandated public company disclosure “up-
grades,” see Jeffrey N. Gordon, Independent Directors in the United States, 1950s-2005: Of Share-
holder Value and Stock Market Prices, 59 STAN. L. REV. 1465, 1541–63 (2007) (arguing that SEC
rule changes and other factors have dramatically improved stock price informativeness since the 1950s).
For an empirical study supporting the view that Sarbanes-Oxley successfully improved the quality of
corporate information disclosure to the market, see Pankaj K. Jain et al., Trends and Determinants of
Market Liquidity in the Pre- and Post-Sarbanes-Oxley Act Periods (2006) available at http://
ssrn.com/abstract=488142.
41. Susan Pulliam, Randall Smith & Michael Siconolfi, U.S. Investors Face an Age of Murky Pricing;
Values of Securities Tougher to Pin Down, WALL ST. J., Oct. 12, 2007, at A1.
42. Title I of Sarbanes-Oxley establishes the PCAOB, outlines its organization, requires registration with the
Board by public accounting firms, and grants the Board authority to establish rules regarding auditing.
See  Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 § 101(a), 15 U.S.C. §7211(a) (Supp. IV 2004) (“There is established the
Public Company Accounting Oversight Board, to oversee the audit of public companies that are subject to
the securities laws, and related matters, in order to protect the interests of investors and further the public
interest in the preparation of informative, accurate, and independent audit reports for companies the
securities of which are sold to, and held by and for, public investors. The Board shall be a body corporate,
operate as a nonprofit corporation, and have succession until dissolved by an Act of Congress.”); see also
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 § 101(c), 15 U.S.C. § 7211(c) (Supp. IV 2004).
43. David Reilly, In Current Crunch, Auditors Stand Firm on Accounting Practices, WALL ST. J, Oct.
17, 2007, at C1 (quoting Lynn Turner, a former chief accountant at the SEC, who concurred that public
company auditors are doing a better job than they had before the scandals of 2001 to 2002 and also before
the savings and loan crisis).
44. See Tom Lauricella et al., More Zeroes for Investors, WALL ST. J., Jan. 18, 2008, at C1.
45. For a discussion and accounts of recent pay packages in Wall Street firms that are suffering massive losses,
see Liam Pleven & Susanne Craig, Financiers Reap Riches Even as Deals Wobble, WALL ST. J. , Jan.
17, 2008, at D1;  Landon Thomas Jr., What’s $34 Billion on Wall St.? A Subprime Strategy Im-
plodes. But Some of Its Captains Are Just Fine, WALL ST. J., Jan. 27, 2008, at Sunday Business 1.
46. For academic commentary and prescriptions for reform, see LUCIAN BEBCHUK & JESSE FREID, PAY
WITHOUT PERFORMANCE: THE UNFULFILLED PROMISE OF EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION 189 (2004)
(“Thus, the problems of executive compensation can be fully addressed only by adopting reforms that would
confront boards with a different set of incentives and constraints.”).  For a critical review of the latter, see
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ness-friendly U.S. president recently warned that such outsized compensation
awards are undermining Americans’ faith in the fairness of the economic
system.47
Confidence that activist investors will rouse themselves to oppose excesses in
executive pay has been compromised by the SEC’s seemingly never-ending re-
forms to compensation disclosure.  These disclosure reforms seem consistently to
deliver far less clarity than promised.48  Furthermore, at least through 2007, the
Commission (which had been criticized for laxity in hearings shortly after En-
ron’s demise)49 was under intense political and business pressure to back off from
further regulation and even to loosen Sarbanes-Oxley’s dictates pertaining to in-
ternal controls certification.50  In addition, the U.S. Supreme Court has contin-
John E. Core et al., Is U.S. CEO Compensation Inefficient Pay Without Performance?, 103 MICH.
L. REV. 1142, 1181 (2005) (reviewing LUCIAN BEBCHUK & JESSE FREID, PAY WITHOUT PERFORM-
ANCE: THE UNFULFILLED PROMISE OF EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION (2004)) (“[Bebchuk and Fried] ig-
nore executives’ stock and option portfolios, which are the primary source of their incentives.”).  For a
recent discussion of the problematically high levels of compensation affecting both chief executives and
directors, see James R. Hagerty & Joann S. Lublin, Countrywide Directors’ Dilemma, WALL ST. J.,
Nov. 3, 2007, at B1 (“Critics have long questioned the outsize pay packages and lucrative share sales of
Countrywide Financial Corp.’s chairman and chief executive, Angelo Mozilo. But outside members of the
company’s board also have above average compensation, and three of them have sold more than $2 million
of Countrywide shares apiece since mid-2006.”); Pleven & Craig, supra note 7 (reporting that former
CEOs of Citigroup and Merrill Lynch, who lost their positions on account of their firms’ multi-billion
dollar losses, left with compensation packages, including stock, valued at $29.5 million and $161.5 million
respectively).  The same article reported that the House Committee on Oversight and Government Re-
form has scheduled hearings in which these and other executives were called to account for their pay
packages. Id.
47. John D. McKinnon & Greg Hitt, Bush Vows Push for Trade, Chides Boards on Pay, WALL ST. J.,
Oct. 12, 2007, at A1.
48. The SEC’s most recent revisions to executive compensation disclosure were in excess of four hundred pages.
See  Executive Compensation and Release Person Disclosure, Securities Act Release No. 8732A, Exchange
Act Release No. 54302A, Investment Company Act Release No. 27444A, 2006 SEC LEXIS 2016 (Aug.
29, 2006). For a  helpful summary of the revised compensation disclosure requirements, see MORRISON &
FOERSTER, SEC RELEASES FINAL RULES ON EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION DISCLOSURE (2006), http://
www.mofo.com/news/updates/bulletins/bulletin02189.html. See also Annual Review of Federal Secur-
ities Regulation, 62 BUS. LAW. 1065, 1067–88 (2007).  For a critique of the intersection between SEC
efforts on compensation and state corporate law standards, see Jennifer S. Martin, The House of Mouse
and Beyond: Assessing the SEC’s Efforts to Regulate Executive Compensation, 32 DEL. J. CORP.
L. 481 (2007). See also Eric Dash, S.E.C. Finds Fault on Pay Disclosures, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 10,
2007, at C3.
49. For a comprehensive index and links to Congressional hearings on Enron, see LAW LIBRARY OF
CONG., ENRON HEARINGS, http://www.loc.gov/law/help/guide/federal/enronhrgs.html (last visited Feb.
11, 2008).
50. See Jonathan D. Glater, Here It Comes: The Sarbanes-Oxley Backlash, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 17, 2005,
at 3 (“Last week, business representatives gathered in Washington at an all-day roundtable discussion
held by federal regulators and complained about the cost of complying with a provision of the Sarbanes-
Oxley corporate reform law.”).  The greatest outcry has surrounded the complaint that Section 404 of
Sarbanes-Oxley has occasioned excessive costs and has, especially, imposed hardships on midcap or smaller
capitalized firms.  On the latter, see Robert Prentice, Sarbanes-Oxley: The Evidence Regarding the
Impact of SOX 404, 29 CARDOZO L. REV. 703 (2007).
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ued to chip away at public investors’ ability to employ SEC Rule 10b-5 to bring
class actions for corporate fraud, as exemplified most recently by its decision in
Stoneridge Investment Partners v. Scientific-Atlanta.51
In conclusion, the first decade of the twenty-first century is shaping up to be
an extraordinarily tumultuous period in respect to public companies’ corporate
governance and securities market activities.  For these reasons, though enor-
mously significant, Sarbanes-Oxley, the SEC’s implementing regulations, and
the stock exchanges’ new listing standards may seem like a few stones in a river
that has not calmed.
III. Assessing Sarbanes-Oxley’s Effects
It is exceedingly difficult to assess the progress resulting from the corporate
and securities law reforms inspired by Sarbanes-Oxley.  Although a full account
of the empirical and legal explanations for this opacity is beyond the scope of this
foreword, certain basic challenges to greater clarity can be identified.
A. Bolstering Corporate Legitimacy and Rule of Law Values
First, if Sarbanes-Oxley’s enactment constitutes a watershed in corporate
law reform—and I believe it does—it is not because the Act effectuated sweep-
ing, transformative changes in corporate and securities law.  To the contrary,
most of the law reforms effectuated by the Act and the ensuing SEC regulations
had circulated for years as “best practices.”52  The “watershed” aspect of Sarbanes-
Oxley, as stated previously, stems from the fact that the Act objectified  what had
previously been looser norms or quasi-authoritative, professional standards and
then codified them in the canon of binding federal laws and regulations.  In so
doing, Sarbanes-Oxley altered the pre-existing equilibrium between governance
and regulation, as well as the pre-existing equilibrium between federal law’s and
state law’s oversight of corporate governance.53  Both of these changes are highly
51. 128 S. Ct. 761 (2008).
52. See, e.g., Lawrence Cunningham, The Sarbanes-Oxley Yawn: Heavy Rhetoric, Light Reform (And
It Just Might Work), 35 CONN. L. REV. 915 (2003).  For a recitation of the best practices that circulated
to business leaders, sometimes through their lawyers’ commentary, see generally ORG. FOR ECON. CO-
OPERATION AND DEV., OECD PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE (1999); NAT’L ASS’N OF COR-
PORATE DIRS., REPORT OF THE NACD BEST PRACTICES COUNCIL: COPING WITH FRAUD AND OTHER
ILLEGAL ACTIVITY (1998); CORPORATE DIRECTOR’S GUIDEBOOK, supra note 6. See also Helen S.
Scott, The SEC, the Audit Committee Rules, and the Marketplaces: Corporate Governance and
the Future, 79 WASH. U. L. Q. 549 (2001); Melvin Aron Eisenberg, The Architecture of American
Corporate Law: Facilitation and Regulation, 2 BERKELEY BUS. L. J. 167 (2005) (describing the ag-
glomerative nature of American corporate governance as a mosaic of inputs from authoritative legislative
bodies, industry proposals, judicial pronouncements, and market forces); Melvin A. Eisenberg, Corporate
Governance: The Board of Directors and Internal Control, 19 CARDOZO L. REV. 237 (1997).
53. See Steele, supra note 10; William W. Bratton & Joseph A. McCahery, The Equilibrium Content of
Corporate Federalism, 41 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 619 (2006); Lisa M. Fairfax, Sarbanes-Oxley, Cor-
porate Federalism, and the Declining Significance of Federal Reforms on State Director Indepen-
dence Standards, 31 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 381 (2005).
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significant, notwithstanding that their near-term practical effects are impossible
to quantify.
In this valorization of the role of law, Sarbanes-Oxley reflects an apprecia-
tion of the fragility of organizations that suffer a loss of value legitimacy (e.g., a
widely perceived shortfall in honesty, transparency, and accountability for trans-
gressions).  The Act’s provisions are an attempt to shore up these value commit-
ments in regard to public companies, accounting firms, and other professional
institutions substantially affecting the marketplace.  In this regard, the Act’s
broader purposes are illuminated by reading it in the context of its political and
social moment.54  Enron’s and WorldCom’s “crack-ups” coincided with the suffer-
ing, demoralization, and economic hardship ensuing from Al Qaeda’s attacks on
the World Trade Center and the Pentagon.55  In addition, in the scrutiny ensuing
after Enron’s collapse, members of Congress were widely “tagged” with having
received generous campaign contributions from that company—at the same time
that its role in precipitating California’s energy crisis was coming to light.  By
enacting Sarbanes-Oxley, Congress was simultaneously seeking to shore up its
legitimacy and exhorting and mandating that public companies and their advis-
ers do the same.  Once this important, value-driven dimension of Sarbanes-
Oxley comes into view, the “mathematics” of calculating its effects is altered, since
its purpose is broader than increasing economic efficiency and investor wealth in
the near term.56
B. Sarbanes-Oxley and Corporate Boards of Directors, An
Unfinished Project
To return to business-oriented particulars, Sarbanes-Oxley’s efficacy has
been blunted by the fact that its substantive provisions are not nearly as compre-
hensive as its controversial reception might suggest.57  Many fundamental
54. Kahn, supra note 3 (describing the complex socio-economic forces at play in the months prior to Sarbanes-
Oxley’s enactment, including the background of Enron’s extensive political contributions and Kenneth
Lay’s connections to the Bush family—hence politicians’ incentives to distance themselves from perceived
corporate corruption).  For further consideration of Sarbanes-Oxley from a socio-economics perspective, see
Fanto, supra note 4; Donald C. Langevoort, The Social Construction of Sarbanes-Oxley, 105 MICH.
L. REV. 1817 (2007).
55. See Kahn, supra note 3.
56. There is considerable irony in reading Sarbanes-Oxley from this perspective, unfortunately, because the
Bush administration has a poor record in terms of its respect for the rule of law and its adherence to the
values associated with it.  The Bush administration’s nonconformity with constitutional limits on execu-
tive power was recently discussed in a debate between Harvard constitutional law professor Charles Fried
and Fritz Schwarz of New York University School of Law’s Brennan Center on the Bill Moyers Journal
on October 26, 2007.  Their debate can be viewed at http://www.pbs.org/moyers/journal/10262007/
watch.html.  For a longer exposition of the argument that the Bush administration has trampled on
domestic and international rights since 9/11, see FREDERICK A.O. SCHWARZ JR. & AZIZ Z. HUQ, UN-
CHECKED AND UNBALANCED (2007); CHARLIE SAVAGE, TAKEOVER: THE RETURN OF THE IMPERIAL
PRESIDENCY AND THE SUBVERSION OF AMERICAN DEMOCRACY (2007).
57. See supra note 22.
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problems in corporate governance and financial market oversight are not ad-
dressed at all or are addressed only obliquely or indirectly in the Act.  For exam-
ple, the Act addresses executive compensation only in its somewhat curious
prohibition on corporate loans to insiders.58  Sarbanes-Oxley does nothing to
shore up the systems of corporate governance that immediately influence execu-
tive compensation decisions—most obviously, compensation committees.
In light of commentary like the Powers Report (which assessed the dysfunc-
tion of Enron’s board), the recent corporate governance scandals precipitated
much agitation about reforming public companies’ boards of directors, including,
perhaps, the process of shareholder elections of directors.59  Yet the Act is quite
conservative in its board-related reforms.  It merely mandates that public compa-
nies’ audit committees be composed exclusively of independent directors,60 and it
charges the SEC with overseeing upgrades to corporate governance related listing
standards.  And while the exchanges and the self regulatory organizations have
responded to this exhortation by clarifying and upgrading their standards for
board independence (in regard to overall board composition and the composition
of key functional committees),61 there is ample room to doubt whether these stan-
58. See  Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 § 402, 15 U.S.C. § 78m(k) (Supp IV 2004).  Sarbanes-Oxley requires a
CEO and chief financial officer (“CFO”) to disgorge bonus or options compensation tied to periods for
which there has been an earnings’ restatement on account of corporate wrongdoing.  Sarbanes-Oxley Act
of 2002 § 304, 15 U.S.C. § 7243 (Supp IV 2004). The Act prohibits managers from being able to trade
during pension blackout periods.  Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 § 306, 15 U.S.C. § 7244 (Supp IV 2004).
It also requires timelier reporting of trades by insiders and major stockholders relevant to short swing
profit liability.  Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 § 403(a), 15 U.S.C. § 78(p)(a) (Supp IV 2004).
59. See, e.g., Jeffrey N. Gordon, What Enron Means for the Management and Control of the Modern
Business Corporation: Some Initial Reflections, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 1233 (2002) (noting the conflicts
affecting purportedly independent directors at Enron and Enron’s potential to destabilize the monitoring
model of the corporate board); William W. Bratton, Enron and the Dark Side of Shareholder Value, 76
TUL. L. REV. 1275 (2002); Leo E. Strine Jr., Derivative Impact? Some Early Reflections on the
Corporation Law Implications of the Enron Debacle, 57 BUS. LAW. 1371, 1373 (“I believe that Enron
will ignite a fiery debate centered upon the so-called ‘independent director.’ ”).  Several commentators
noted that purportedly independent directors on Enron’s board may have been influenced by large scale
“charitable contributions” to their home institutions.  For early commentary on this problem, see Faith
Stevelman Kahn, Pandora’s Box: Managerial Discretion and the Problem of Corporate Philan-
thropy, 44 UCLA  L. REV. 579, 609–21.  For further consideration of the problem as relevant to litiga-
tion disputing the independence of Oracle’s special litigation committee, see In re Oracle Corp. Derivative
Litig., 824 A.2d 917, 920 (Del. Ch. 2003). For commentary on the standards of independence applied by
the Delaware court therein, see Elizabeth Cosenza, The Holy Grail of Corporate Governance Reform:
Independence or Democracy?, 2007 B.Y.U. L. REV. 1 (2007).  Recent amendments to stock exchange
listing standards acknowledge the potential for such contributions to abridge outside directors’ indepen-
dence; in defining standards for independent directors they prohibit these and other forms of indirect as
well as more direct financial ties that might compromise directors’ independence. See infra note 61.
60. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 § 301, 15 U.S.C. § 78j-1(m) (Supp. IV 2004).
61. Under the rules of the New York Stock Exchange, a majority of the directors on a public company’s board
must be independent. See NYSE LISTED COMPANY MANUAL § 303A.00 (2006) available at http://
www.nyse.com/Frameset.html?nyseref=http%3A//www.nyse.com/regulation/listed/1182508124422.html
&displayPage=/lcm/lcm_section.html.
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dards go far enough in fostering impartiality and the absence of “beholden-ness”
assumed in the bedrock constructs of state corporate law.
Even more dramatically, neither Sarbanes-Oxley nor any subsequent SEC
reforms have improved the still formalistic process of shareholder election of di-
rectors.  The present amalgamation of federal securities and state corporate laws
still perpetuate largely passive, demographically homogenous boards rife with soft
conflicts and propensities to cronyism.  As corporate legal scholars have increas-
ingly noted, because such boards are highly susceptible to “groupthink,”62 they are
poorly equipped to take on the expansive set of responsibilities assigned to them in
the contemporary corporate governance model; for example, vetting corporate
strategy, monitoring conflicts of interest and self-dealing transactions, overseeing
the quality of internal control systems and legal compliance, overseeing CEO-
selection, replacement, and incentive/compensation arrangements, accommodat-
ing the demands of equity investors with the claims of non-shareholder constitu-
encies, and managing external relations including global geo-political risk.
Although corporate law increasingly relies on the acts and approvals of indepen-
dent directors, the existing legal frameworks have not facilitated the development
of processes and institutions, which would furnish public companies with outside
directors properly situated and freed up to take on the responsibilities that law
and practice assign them.63
A few years ago, I authored a research paper advocating the need for legal
and social/institutional changes, which would foster the growth of a corps of “pro-
fessional independent directors.”  The motivating force for my research agenda
62. For a discussion of the problems associated with board homogeneity and attendant “groupthink,” see
Lynne L. Dallas, A Preliminary Inquiry into the Responsibility of Corporation and their Officers
and Directors for Corporate Climate: The Psychology of Enron’s Demise, 35 RUTGERS L.J. 1
(2003); Lynne L. Dallas, The New Managerialism and Diversity on Corporate Boards of Directors,
76 TUL. L. REV. 1363 (2002); Marleen A. O’Connor, The Enron Board: The Perils of GroupThink,
71 U. CIN. L. REV. 1233 (2004); Joan MacLeod Heminway, Sex, Trust, and Corporate Boards, 18
HASTINGS WOMEN’S L.J. 173 (2007).  For seminal articles on board function focusing on the role and
limits of independent directors, see generally Lynne L. Dallas, Proposals for Reform of Corporate
Boards of Directors: The Dual Board and Board Ombudsperson, 54 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 91
(1997) (prescribing fundamental structural reform of corporate boards); Jill E. Fisch, Taking Boards
Seriously, 19 CARDOZO L. REV. 265 (1997) (rejecting one-size-fits-all approach to board regulations);
Donald C. Langevoort, The Human Nature of Corporate Boards: Law, Norms, and the Unintended
Consequences of Independence and Accountability, 89 GEO. L.J. 797 (2001) (describing certain neg-
ative implications of predominance of independent directors for public company boards). See also James
D. Cox, Managing and Monitoring Conflicts of Interest: Empowering the Outside Directors with
Independent Counsel , 48 VILL. L. REV. 1077 (2003).
63. The Delaware Chancery Court has proposed doing away with the entire fairness standard in freeze-out
transactions by controlling shareholders principally on the rationale that independent directors’ approvals
of such transactions (especially in combination with a majority of the minority votes) provide adequate
protection against overreaching by controlling shareholders. See In re Cox Commc’ns. Inc., S’holders
Litig., 879 A.2d 604 (Del. Ch. 2005).  For a critique of the adequacy of director approvals in this context,
see Faith Stevelman, Going Private at the Intersection of the Market and the Law, 62 BUS. LAW. 775
(2007).
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was that corporate law is increasingly limiting the scope for private litigation
and liability to operate as disciplining forces and, instead, relying on outside di-
rectors’ approvals as a primary mode of corporate governance and accountability
to investors.  Nor are takeovers a neat or necessarily efficient disciplining force
outside of egregious instances of management ineptitude.  The problem with rely-
ing principally on “outside” (presumably “independent”) directors is that they
are—by definition—principally engaged in another professional situation.  In-
deed, public company outside directors are not uncommonly sitting executives
elsewhere.  This situation leaves many of these individuals with too little time
and professional attention to devote to the increasingly critical job of public com-
pany board service.
None of the Sarbanes-Oxley-inspired changes address this practical/institu-
tional problem. For these reasons, I proposed that a new institution akin to the
PCAOB be created.  Such a new director oversight body might be able to devise
an alternative compensation system, which would help liberate outside directors
from having to have a separate, full time job while they served as a public com-
pany independent director.  In the same way that public companies contribute
funds (on a sliding scale) to support the PCAOB, they could pool funds to support
this cadre of new director candidates to fill some of the slots for independent
directors.  The PCAOB-like director oversight board could also support ongoing
professional education and voluntary certification systems for public company di-
rector candidates, and thereby, encourage their nomination to public companies’
boards.  It was clear to me, also, that these social and professional changes would
allow women to capitalize on these new opportunities—which would be mutu-
ally beneficial to the women themselves and the companies where they served as
directors.  There is ample evidence that highly motivated, well-trained, accom-
plished women are increasingly leaving Wall Street law firms, investment banks,
and prestigious consulting firms in search of greater professional freedom and
flexibility.  These goals would be compatible with service on public companies’
boards.
Unfortunately, my reform agenda provoked extraordinarily harsh criticism.
Some commentators objected that we do not really need corporate boards of direc-
tors.  Many comments reflected the existence of widespread confusion and disa-
greement about the scope and substance of public company directors’ legal and
professional roles and duties.  Some commentators suggested that such a profes-
sional oversight body would serve primarily to effectuate a professional monop-
oly.  One commentator objected that since standards of professional responsibility
for lawyers had (in his opinion) proved meaningless, standards of professional
responsibility for public company directors could not be expected to be more per-
suasive and effective.  Some commentators proposed that no one with the neces-
sary talents would accept a position (or up to three, I proposed) that paid less than
$150,000 or so a piece—a comment I found particularly disturbing.  In any
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event, like my research agenda in this area, the project of fully addressing the
practical problems that inhibit the efficacy of outside, independent directors re-
mains a work in progress.
Furthermore, in an era when the leading contenders for the Democratic
nomination for the presidency are an African-American man and a woman, the
minimal demographic diversity of corporate boards remains a salient problem for
corporate America, especially as companies are increasingly compelled to operate
internationally in order to remain competitive.  Again, greater demographic di-
versity would likely be a byproduct of meaningful structural reform to the direc-
tor election process, but such reforms have repeatedly failed.
On several occasions, the SEC has proposed new rules, which would have
allowed large shareholders to use the corporate proxy statement to nominate a
separate slate of directors (in narrowly defined circumstances).  In each instance,
however, the SEC has retracted its proposal in the face of a wall of resistance to
change.64  Notwithstanding the more stringent independence standards adopted
by the exchanges, broader reform to the board election process—structural reform
extending far beyond that inspired by Sarbanes-Oxley—will be required if cor-
porate boards are to fulfill their full oversight responsibilities, including those
that pertain to monitoring the quality of their firms’ systems of information gath-
ering and reporting.65  In sum, corporate law scholars’ early intuition that the
rash of major frauds and oversight failures that came to light throughout 2001
and 2002 would instigate a fundamental restructuring of the institution of the
corporate board has not panned out.66  Sarbanes-Oxley has inspired much worth-
64. In July 2007, the SEC proposed amendments to the shareholder proposal process that would allow certain
shareholders to include their own director nominees in the management’s proxy statement in certain lim-
ited circumstances. See Shareholder Proposals, Exchange Act Release No. 56160, Investment Company
Act Release No. 27913, 2007 SEC LEXIS 1651 (July 27, 2007).  In December 2007, the SEC then
reverted back to the original rule that shareholders cannot use the proxy to insert their own nominees for
consideration. See Shareholder Proposals Relating to the Election of Directors, Exchange Act Release No.
56914, Investment Company Act Release No. 28075, 2007 SEC LEXIS 2845, *9–10 (Dec. 6, 2007)
(“[T]he staff has determined that shareholder proposals that may result in a contested election — including
those which establish a procedure to list shareholder-nominated director candidates in the company’s proxy
materials — fall within the election exclusion.  We agree with this position and believe it is consistent
with the explanation that the Commission gave in 1976.”); Press Release, SEC, SEC Votes to Codify
Long Standing Policy on Shareholder Proposals on Election Procedures (Nov. 28, 2007).  For citation and
commentary on proposed SEC Rule 14a-11, see George Dent, The Case for Real Shareholder Democ-
racy, 55 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 581 (2005) (commenting on proposed SEC Rule 14a-11). See also Kara
Scannell, SEC Chairman’s Proxy Pitch Loses Steam, WALL ST. J., Nov. 15, 2007, at C1.
65. See, e.g., Hillary A. Sale, Independent Directors as Securities Monitors, 61 BUS. LAW. 1375 (2006)
(analyzing the existing regulations and focusing on the SEC’s efforts to heighten requirements for
independent directors oversight of corporate filings).  For a discussion of boards’ duty to oversee their
firms’ public disclosures under corporate fiduciary law, see Faith Stevelman Kahn, Transparency and
Accountability: Rethinking Corporate Fiduciary Law’s Relevance to Corporate Disclosure, 34 GA.
L. REV. 505 (2000).
66. See  Leo E. Strine, Jr., Derivative Impact? Some Early Reflections on the Corporation Law Implica-
tions of the Enron Debacle, 57 BUS. LAW. 1371 (2002); Jeffrey N. Gordon, What Enron Means for
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while academic discussion about corporate boards, but achieving real world
change in this cornerstone institution of corporate governance has proven exqui-
sitely difficult.
C. More Reports, Not Necessarily More Action
The Act also sought to foster reform by identifying “hot” areas for further
study.  In particular, in Sarbanes-Oxley Congress called on the SEC to oversee
the production of reports on: (1) the “consolidation” of public accounting firms so
that relatively few remained, and its implications for the quality of auditing;67
(2) the roles, conflicts of interest, and barriers to entry affecting credit rating
agencies;68 (3) the amount and kinds of enforcement actions brought by the SEC
in the five years preceding the Act;69 (4) the occurrence of securities violations
(including aiding and abetting) by lawyers, investment bankers, broker-dealers,
and public accountants;70 and (5) investment bankers’ and investment advisers’
potential complicity in earnings management and financial statement fraud.71
However, these calls for further study have infrequently produced meaningful
action and, thus, have not had much positive influence on the areas of concern or
the problems they flagged.
D. What Gets Lost in the “Origami” of Securities Laws and
Regulations
Analyzing Sarbanes-Oxley’s efficaciousness is also complicated by the fact
that in many instances, the Act directly effectuates “merely” a broad mandate for
further SEC action.72   Not infrequently, the Act’s precise impact was left by
the Management and Control of Modern Business Corporation: Some Initial Reflections 69 U.
CHI. L. REV. 1233 (2002).  There were several prominent reports that described gross failures of oversight
by independent directors in preventing false corporate reporting and ruinous insider self-dealing transac-
tions. See WILLIAM C. POWERS, JR. ET AL., REPORT OF INVESTIGATION BY THE SPECIAL INVESTIGA-
TIVE COMMITTEE OF THE BOARD OF DIRECTORS OF ENRON CORP. (2002), available at http://
fl1.findlaw.com/news.findlaw.com/wp/docs/enron/specinv020102rpt1.pdf; see also RICHARD C.
BREEDEN, RESTORING TRUST: REPORT TO THE HON. JED S. RAKOFF: THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT
COURT FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK ON CORPORATE GOVERNANCE FOR THE FUTURE
OF MCI, INC. 13 (2003), available at  http://www.thedirectorscollege.com/images/downloads/
Breeden%20Report%20Restoring%20Trust.pdf; In re WorldCom Inc. Sec. Litig., 346 F. Supp. 2d 628,
663 (S.D.N.Y. 2004) (holding independent directors responsible for conducting a reasonable investigation
of the portions of the registration statement that are not made on the authority of an expert).
67. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 § 701, 15 U.S.C. § 7201 (Supp. IV 2004).
68. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, §702, 116 Stat. 745, 797–98.
69. Id. § 704, 116. Stat. at 799.
70. Id. § 703, 116. Stat. at 798–99.
71. Id. § 705, 116. Stat. at 799–800.
72. For an analysis of the legal and democratic problems associated with congressional delegation and admin-
istrative regulation, see DAVID SCHOENBROD, POWER WITHOUT RESPONSIBILITY: HOW CONGRESS
ABUSES THE PEOPLE THROUGH DELEGATION (1993). Compare id. with Edward L. Rubin, Getting
Past Democracy, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 711, 716 (2001).
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Congress to subsequent SEC action, as well as responses by the stock exchanges,
self regulatory organizations, and the federal courts.  This process of “churning”
through successive layers of legislation, regulation, quasi-authoritative standard
setting, and adjudication opens the door for Congress to make bold statements
that may be decoupled, potentially, from subsequent bold legal action.  The con-
troversies and compromises affecting the SEC’s final rules relating to the appro-
priate standards of conduct for corporate lawyers observing signs of corporate
illegality are evidence of this dynamic.73
Furthermore, as is always the case in regard to the SEC’s regulations, its
rules implementing Sarbanes-Oxley’s mandates are both highly complex and de-
tailed—and they have rolled out, in changing iterations, against the backdrop of
a dynamic economy.  Even if the complexity in the SEC’s regulations is necessary
and warranted in light of the intricacy of what is being regulated, this complexity
means that their merits and shortcomings of these regulations will not be readily
apparent on their face.74  Each of these factors complicates the project of assessing
Sarbanes-Oxley’s impact.
E. The Act’s Criminal Provisions and the Modalities of Legal
Persuasion
Sarbanes-Oxley’s provisions speak to the conduct of many different actors in
the corporate governance system: CEOs and chief financial officers (“CFOs”),
boards and audit committees, general counsel, auditing firms, whistleblowers,
and prosecutors pursuing white collar indictments and penalties.  These different
actors are likely to be pleased and persuaded, or displeased and disgruntled, in
different measures by the changes wrought by the Act.75  Restated from a broader
perspective, corporate law (like other areas of law) becomes efficacious—persua-
sive in influencing the conduct of individuals and institutions—by operating
through many different modalities, both formal and informal.  This facet of the
law-in-action has been illuminated by the research of “law and society”-oriented
scholars, although their work has uncommonly focused on the influence of corpo-
rate or securities law.76
73. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 § 307, 15 U.S.C. § 7245 (Supp. IV 2004).
74. For an analysis of the normative power of what is left unstated in the federal securities laws and regula-
tions, see Faith Stevelman Kahn, Legislatures, Courts and the SEC: Reflections on Silence and
Power in Corporate and Securities Law, 41 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 1107, 1109 (1997) (“[L]ike the
normative, political dimensions of the modern corporate philanthropy laws, the normative, political
dimensions of the SEC’s disclosure policies are not express in the securities regulations themselves, and
hence are not readily apparent.”).
75. For a discussion of Sarbanes-Oxley’s differentiated reception among corporate executives, institutional
investors, the securities industry, accountants, auditors, lawyers, regulators, and the media, see Donald C.
Langevoort, The Social Construction of Sarbanes-Oxley, 105 MICH. L. REV. 1817, 1834–45 (2007).
76. See, e.g., TOM TYLER, WHY PEOPLE OBEY THE LAW 3–4 (1990) (arguing that people obey the law
when they internalize respect for it); Dan M. Kahan, Social Influence, Social Meaning, and Deter-
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Sarbanes-Oxley’s criminal provisions, set forth in Titles VIII, IX, and XI
thereof, are especially interesting from this perspective.77  Although Sarbanes-
Oxley redresses minor gaps in the framework of criminal liability for fraud, the
Act’s criminal provisions are most notable for increasing the maximum fines and
jail terms for these offenses.78  These higher penalties and jail terms should be
interpreted most fundamentally as added socio-legal admonishment against cor-
porate fraud, because prosecutors rarely, if ever, were genuinely hindered by the
previous statutory ceilings on fines and jail terms.79  Moreover, despite certain
high publicity cases, it isn’t clear that the average criminal penalties for corporate
fraud have increased substantially or lastingly since the Act’s passage.  Notwith-
standing the outcry arising from the post-Enron financial scandals, the govern-
ment has commonly encountered substantial hurdles to white collar convictions
and vigorous prosecutions.  For example, white collar prosecutions commonly in-
spire fervent condemnations of governmental abuse of power.80  Despite
Sarbanes-Oxley and the corporate abuses of power that precipitated it, as a na-
tion, we remain deeply ambivalent about white collar prosecutions.81
Similarly, the Act’s whistleblower provisions82 have not altered the fact that
“squealing” on your fraudster colleagues is a virtual guarantee of a failed career
rence , 83 VA. L. REV. 349, 351 (1997); LYNNE DALLAS, LAW AND PUBLIC POLICY: A SOCIO-ECO-
NOMIC APPROACH (2005).
77. See  Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 tit. 9, 107 Pub. L. No. 204, §§ 901–906, 116 Stat. 745, 804–06 (codi-
fied in scattered sections of 18, 28 and 29 U.S.C.); Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 tit. 11, 107 Pub. L. No.
204, §§ 1101–1107, 116 Stat. 745, 807–10 (codified in scattered sections of 15, 18 and 28 U.S.C.).
78. See, e.g., Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 § 1107, 18 U.S.C. §1513(e) (Supp. IV 2004) (making knowing
retaliation against a corporate whistleblower a criminal offense).
79. For a discussion of the government’s reluctance to prosecute corporate fraud in the most vigorous manner
possible, and its mixed success in achieving criminal convictions in white collar cases,  see, for example,
Lisa H. Nicholson, The Culture of Under-Enforcement: Buried Treasure, Sarbanes-Oxley and the
Corporate Pirate, 5 DEPAUL BUS. & COM. L.J. 321 (2007); J. Kelly Strader, White Collar Crime and
Punishment: Reflections on Michael, Martha, and Milberg Weiss, 15 GEO. MASON L. REV. 45
(2007).
80. See, e.g., Bruce H. Kobayashi & Larry E. Ribstein, The Hypocrisy of the Milberg Indictment, 2 BUS
& TECH. L. 369, 371 (2007) (“Even more fundamentally, this article shows that the prosecution of Mil-
berg shares attributes with the ‘abusive’ class action lawsuits targeted by the Milberg prosecution.”).
81. See Kathleen F. Brickey, In Enron’s Wake: Corporate Executives on Trial, 96 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMI-
NOLOGY 397 (2006); Strader, supra note 79; Nicholson, supra note 79. See generally CORPORATE
FRAUD TASK FORCE, SECOND YEAR REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT (2004); FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGA-
TIONS, FINANCIAL CRIMES REPORT TO THE PUBLIC (2005).  For examples of recent cases involving
corporate fraud, see Tim Arango, Black Given Prison Term Over Fraud, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 11, 2007,
at C1; Michael J. de la Merced, Former Outside Counsel is Charged in Refco Fraud, N.Y. TIMES,
Dec. 19, 2007, at C3.
82. See  Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 § 806(a), 18 U.S.C. § 1514A (Supp IV 2004); see also 18 U.S.C.
§ 1513(e).
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and crushing legal fees.83  Congress did not go far enough in creating a meaning-
fully protective scheme for corporate whistleblowers in Sarbanes-Oxley.
F. Expanded Corporate Regulation but Limited Liability
In assessing Sarbanes-Oxley’s efficacy, it is notable that most of the Act’s
prescriptions and prohibitions are not matched by attendant civil liability provi-
sions.  With the exception of the Act’s slight lengthening of the statute of limita-
tions for private suits alleging fraud,84 Sarbanes-Oxley’s corporate governance,
auditing, and reporting provisions did nothing to expand or even to bolster
shareholders’ increasingly limited ability to bring private lawsuits against com-
panies and their executives.85  The Act does not provide that shareholders may
sue a public company’s general counsel for failing to act upon discovering signs of
fraud.86  Nor does Sarbanes-Oxley provide for private enforcement of the provi-
sions mandating disgorgement of bonuses and other performance-based compen-
sation by corporate CFOs and CEOs when their firms have restated their
earnings on account of corporate malfeasance.87  In this respect, Congress did al-
most nothing to alter the tide sweeping against private liability for corporate
wrongdoing, or to empower private plaintiffs to “pick up the slack” created by
shortfalls in agency and criminal enforcement.
This pushback against private lawsuits alleging fraud was validated by
Congress in the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, which imposed
substantial procedural hurdles on private class actions and enhanced defendants’
ability to win motions to dismiss.88  Congress further pursued this objective in
enacting the Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act of 1998, which has
preempted most state common law class actions for fraud against publicly listed
companies.89  Such limitations on private recoveries in lawsuits alleging corpo-
rate fraud have also been reinforced by the Supreme Court’s interpretation of
83. This phenomenon has been widely noted and remains true. See, e.g., I.J. Alexander Dyck et al., Who
Blows the Whistle on Corporate Fraud? (European Corporate Governance Inst., Finance Working
Paper No. 156 2007), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract_id=959410.
84. See  Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 § 804, 28 U.S.C. § 1658 (Supp. IV 2004).
85. For example, Sarbanes-Oxley does not allow shareholders to sue a company that includes insider/manage-
ment directors on the audit committee, as is prohibited by the Act. See  Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 § 201,
15 U.S.C. § 78j-1(m) (Supp. IV 2004).
86. See  Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 § 307, 15 U.S.C. § 7245 (Supp. IV 2004).
87. See Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 § 304, 15 U.S.C. § 7243 (Supp. IV 2004).
88. Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-67, 109 Stat. 737 (codified as
amended at scattered sections in 15 U.S.C.).
89. Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-353, 112 Stat. 3227 (codified as
amended at scattered sections in 15 U.S.C.).
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plaintiffs’ burden in demonstrating loss causation.90  Also relevant is the Supreme
Court’s proscription of aiding and abetting liability in private suits under Rule
10b-5—which was accentuated by the recent decision in Stoneridge Partners v.
Scientific-Atlanta.91  In addition, federal circuit courts are applying increas-
ingly stringent standards in ruling on whether to certify shareholder class ac-
tions.92  These pressures and law “reforms” are all limiting the viability of
private lawsuits alleging corporate fraud.
This anti-liability/anti-litigation trend is broadly established in federal law
and unlikely to change in the foreseeable future.  Most graphically, three years
after Sarbanes-Oxley’s passage, Congress enacted the Class Action Fairness Act of
2005.93  This legislation, in its practical impact if not in its declared purpose, will
further limit private actors’ ability to pursue claims of corporate wrongdoing.94
In their totality, these several acts of Congress validate the view that most pri-
vate class actions are detrimental to companies, investors, consumers, and, there-
fore, the American economy overall.  Sarbanes-Oxley’s push toward increased
oversight, transparency, and accountability for public companies foundered on
this cross-current of anti-litigation/anti-liability sentiment, which has limited
Sarbanes-Oxley’s influence.
G. Rising Stock Prices Stem Enthusiasm for Law Reform
The persistently positive performance of U.S. stock market prices since the
enactment of Sarbanes-Oxley has negatively influenced the reception given this
legislation.  At the time of writing this foreword, the American stock markets and
the U.S. economy are suffering serious setbacks,95 but even through October
2007, stock market prices were setting new records.96  Instead of crediting
Sarbanes-Oxley with shoring up investor confidence in the last several years
when stocks performed well, many commentators claimed that the new laws and
regulations were unwarranted and inefficient.  Such resistance from business and
Wall Street is predictable, of course; even the SEC’s prohibition on selective dis-
90. See generally Dura Pharms., Inc. v. Broudo, 544 U.S. 336 (2005).  For insightful commentary on Dura’s
effect on a plaintiff’s burden of proving loss causation, see Jill E. Fisch, Cause for Concern: Causation
and Federal Securities Fraud (Nov. 2006) (unpublished manuscript on file with author).
91. 128 S. Ct. 761 (2008).
92. See  Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Credit Suisse First Boston, Inc., 482 F.3d 372 (5th Cir. 2007).
93. Class Action Fairness Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-2, 119 Stat. 4 (codified as amended in scattered
sections of 28 U.S.C.).
94. See Edward A. Purcell, Jr., The Class Action Fairness Act in Perspective: The Old and the New in
Federal Jurisdiction Reform, 156 U. PA. L. REV. (forthcoming 2008).
95. See, e.g., Greg Ip, Fears of Stagflation Return as Price Increases Gain Pace, WALL ST. J., Feb. 21,
2008, at A1.
96. See, e.g., Nicolas Brulliard, Oil Sector Holds Fast, Even as Crude Gains - - - Lack of Inside Sales
Suggests Optimism; CEO Lifts Holdings, WALL ST. J., Oct. 10, 2007, at C3 (“[T]he stock prices of oil
producers and oil-services companies have also risen to new highs.”).
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closure was met with a virtual tidal wave of opposition, including claims that it
would kill-off the analyst industry and impair efficient levels of corporate disclo-
sure (which it clearly has not done).97  Prior to Sarbanes-Oxley’s enactment,
Warren Buffett’s and Arthur Levitt’s warnings about earnings management
were largely ignored.98  Through the 1990s and the 2000s, many or even most
outspoken corporate legal academics remained skeptical or unsupportive of robust
legal oversight of market actors and public company governance.  Although there
was widespread popular support for Sarbanes-Oxley as of the late spring of 2002
(especially after the revelations of the fraud at WorldCom99), the market’s buoy-
ancy in the years subsequent to Sarbanes-Oxley’s passage made it too easy to
criticize the new laws and regulations as excessive and anti-competitive.100  For
example, in the spring of 2007, three highly influential reports emerged from
serious, high level “working groups” calling for loosening Sarbanes-Oxley-in-
spired legal reforms.101  These reports were enthusiastically received by Wall
Street firms, vocal politicians, conservatively-oriented law reformers, and many
financial reporters.  By the winter of 2007 through 2008, however, enthusiasm
for quashing these law reforms was swamped by the subprime mortgage fiasco
and its widening negative effects.  It seems that during good times, legal over-
sight of business and Wall Street’s conduct is adjudged unwarranted; in hard
times (outside of moments of extraordinary popular outrage), it is described as too
costly.
H. Information Technology and Sarbanes-Oxley
Improvements in information technology are also part of the Sarbanes-
Oxley story. Technology stocks fueled the stock market bubble of the 1990s102
and, hence, the euphoria that clouded investors’ and regulators’ better judgment.
Improvements in information technology in this period also allowed for faster
and cheaper trading of equity securities, which further spurred stock market spec-
97. See Regulation FD, 17 C.F.R. §§243.100–103 (2007).
98. See  Levitt, supra note 19; see also Lawrence A. Cunningham, ed., Conversations from the Warren
Buffett Symposium, 19 CARDOZO L. REV. 719, 799 (1997) (noting Warren Buffet’s caution about the
effects of earnings management).
99. For citation to academic criticisms of Sarbanes-Oxley, see supra note 22.
100. See, e.g., Greg Ip, Kara Scannell & Deborah Solomon, Trade Winds: In Call to Deregulate Business,
A Global Twist, WALL ST. J., Jan. 25, 2007, at A1.
101. See SUSTAINING FINANCIAL SERVICES LEADERSHIP, supra note 18; see also COMM. ON CAPITAL MAR-
KETS REGULATION, INTERIM REPORT (2006), available at http://www.crapo.senate.gov/documents/
committee_capmarkets_reg.pdf; COMM’N ON THE REGULATION OF U.S. CAPITAL MKTS. IN THE 21ST
CENTURY, REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS (2007) available at http://www.capitalmarkets
commission.com/NR/rdonlyres/eozwwssfrqzdm3hd5siogqhp6h2ngxwdpr77qw2bogptzvi5weu6mmi4
plfq6xic7kjonfpg4q2bpks6ryog5wwh5sc/0703capmarkets_full.pdf.
102. See generally E.S. Browning, Buying Long: Why Market Optimists Say this Bull Has Legs - - -
They See Decard of Gain Fed by Global Growth, Wall St. J., May 23, 2007, at A1 (discussing the bull
market of the 1990s).
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ulation.  In a more positive vein, by 1996 the duty of care (as described by the
Delaware Court of Chancery) had evolved to recognize directors’ ongoing respon-
sibilities to monitor the quality of their firms’ systems of information gathering
and reporting103—systems that have been further refined and bolstered by
Sarbanes-Oxley’s provisions.  The Act’s call for increasingly timely corporate re-
porting also builds on developments in information technology.104  Faster,
cheaper computing power and increasingly sophisticated information technology
is enhancing firms’ ability to compete on a global scale.105  However, this same
technology presents heightened potential for abuse, since it can be used to obscure
rather than accurately represent a firm’s operations and financial conditions.106
Accordingly, in response to Sarbanes-Oxley’s new certification requirements, ex-
ecutives have worried aloud about their ability to attest to the adequacy of their
firms’ internal controls.107  One is prompted to ask, however, if they cannot con-
fidently make such attestation, what does this means for their ability to manage
their assets and finances efficiently?
Improvements in information technology are also assisting our study of the
effects of laws and regulations on companies and markets.  Empirical analysis is
at the vanguard of the legal academy—especially as corporate legal scholars in-
creasingly collaborate with economists and other scholars in quantitatively-ori-
ented fields.108  The expanded data sets becoming available are assisting further
103. In re Caremark Int’l Inc. Derivative Litig., 698 A.2d 959, 969–70 (Del. Ch. 1996).  For the Delaware
Supreme Court’s general affirmation of the directors’ ongoing oversight obligations as described by the
Court of Chancery in Caremark, see Stone v. Ritter, 911 A.2d 362 (Del. 2006).
104. See generally Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, tit. 4, 107 P.L. 204, §§ 401–409, 116 Stat. 745, 785–91
(codified in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.).  See also Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 § 403, 15 U.S.C. § 78p
(Supp IV 2004) (enhancing disclosures in periodic reports); Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 § 402, 15 U.S.C.
§ 7262 (Supp. IV 2004) (enhancing disclosures of conflict of interest transactions involving insiders and
principal stockholders and requiring disclosure of management’s assessment of the adequacy of internal
controls); Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 § 406, 15 U.S.C. § 7264 (Supp. IV 2004) (requiring disclosure of
presence or absence of corporate code of ethics); Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 § 407, 15 U.S.C. § 7265
(Supp. IV 2004) (requiring disclosure of presence or absence of financial expert on audit committee);
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 § 409, 15 U.S.C. § 78m (Supp. IV 2004) (requiring ‘real time’ disclosure by
reporting companies).
105. For an account of Enron as a global trading firm, see FRANK PARTNOY, INFECTIOUS GREED: HOW
DECEIT AND RISK CORRUPTED THE FINANCIAL MARKETS (2003).
106. See, e.g. , id.
107. For a thoughtful account of the controversy, see Prentice, supra note 50.
108. For discussion of how improved information technology and information gathering have influenced eco-
nomic analysis, see DIANE COYLE, THE SOULFUL SCIENCE: WHAT ECONOMISTS REALLY DO AND WHY
IT MATTERS 4 (2007).
Economics is enjoying a spectacularly fruitful period, in particular where it overlaps with
other disciplines such as psychology, history or anthropology. . . .  The combination of cheap
computing power, the development of new data sets, and innovations in econometrics and
in analytical and computational techniques has had a very profound influence on economics,
as on other sciences.
Id.
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study of the relationship between corporate and securities law reforms, corporate
performance, and stock market prices.109  Nevertheless, these studies’ implications
for law reform are complicated by the same factors that lend them prestige.  The
full scope of the variables analyzed, the reliability of the data sets, the reasonable-
ness of the underlying assumptions, and the importance of questions not posed all
suggest caution.
I. Global Competition’s Anti-Regulatory Force
Lastly, the global flow of capital is exerting an inhibiting influence on U.S.
lawmakers’ willingness to regulate American firms and markets.  Global compe-
tition across capital, product, and labor markets is pressuring firms, where possi-
ble, to conduct business under legal regimes, which promise the lowest level of
scrutiny and regulatory requirements.  Against the backdrop of such permissible
regulatory arbitrage, Sarbanes-Oxley appears onerous.   The triad of reports call-
ing for repealing or limiting its reforms is evidence of this.110
Ironically, as U.S. stock prices and Wall Street firms are being beset by the
fallout of the subprime mortgage fiasco, foreign governments (whose citizens are
invested and suffering alongside U.S. investors) are calling for more stringent
governance and reporting requirements for U.S. firms and markets.111  Recent
financial events underscore that the financial prosperity arising from high stock
market prices is linked to the presence and enforcement of adequate supervisory
controls on corporate governance and financial reporting, and limits on self-deal-
ing.  Reputation and self-governance are loose safeguards in a world where
anonymous, instantaneous global financial transactions are the norm.112
109. For a recent example analyzing the influence of activist hedge funds on corporate performance, see Frank
Partnoy & Randall S. Thomas, Gap Filling, Hedge Funds, and Financial Innovation, BROOKINGS-
NOMURA PAPERS ON FINANCIAL SERVICES, (Yasuki Fuchita & Robert E. Litan, eds., Brookings Inst.
Press 2007), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=931254.
110. See supra note 101.
111. Heather Timmons & Katrin Bennhold, Calls Grow for Foreigners to Have a Say on U.S. Market
Rules , WALL ST. J., Aug. 29, 2007, at C1 (“Politicians, regulators and financial specialists outside the
United States are seeking a role in the oversight of American markets, banks and rating agencies after
recent problems relating to subprime mortgages. Their argument is simple: the United States is exporting
financial products, but losses to investors in other countries suggest that American regulators are not
properly monitoring the products or alerting investors to the risks.”).
112. See  Renee M. Jones, Law, Norms, and the Breakdown of the Board: Promoting Accountability in
Corporate Governance, 92 IOWA L. REV. 105 (2006); John C. Coffee, Jr., Gatekeeper Failure and
Reform: The Challenge of Fashioning Relevant Reforms, 84 B.U. L. REV. 301 (2004); Frank
Partnoy, Strict Liability for Gatekeepers: A Reply to Professor Coffee, 84 B.U. L. REV. 365 (2004).
For a more optimistic view of the power of reputation as an effective safeguard against corporate miscon-
duct, see John Armour, Who Should Make Corporate Law? EC Legislation versus Regulatory Com-
petition (European Corporate Governance Inst. L. Working Paper No. 54, 2005), available at http://
papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=860444.
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III. Concluding Insights
The academic fields of corporate and securities law bear some interesting
resemblances to the study of medicine.  The cumulative level of complexity and
detail identified in the scholarship on corporate governance and securities law
approximates the complexity in the medical science literature.  In addition, al-
though both academic medicine and the study of corporate and securities law
demonstrate a remarkable level of sophistication, conclusions reached by scholars
in these areas are constantly subject to revision based on new information.  In
medicine and in corporate and securities law, empiricism is laudable, even essen-
tial, but its limits should also be recognized.  Good medical researchers acknowl-
edge that what they find is influenced by what they look for.  And they recognize
that all living organisms (like firms and markets in this analogy) are changing in
the course of their study.  Commentators in the area of corporate governance and
securities law should heed these lessons.  Event studies and econometric analysis
may yield important insights and policy prescriptions for corporate and securities
law.  But judges and legislators should proceed with caution before “junking”
legal protections intended to benefit shareholders and other investors.
Some legal scholars take the limits of empirical proofs as a rationale for
reducing the role of law in corporate governance and the capital markets.  Others
counsel greater regulatory competition—that is, variation and choice among legal
regimes.  Other corporate legal scholars, myself included, believe that firms and
markets must, by definition, exist in a collaborative relationship with the law if
there is to be meaningful social and economic progress.  As was evident in our
symposium, these disagreements are profound; as in debates over medicine and
science, the experts believe that something precious is at stake.
Finally, it bears noting that the increasing specialization of corporate and
securities law (like the advance of medical science) has generated an academic
elite. This is an inevitable byproduct of the maturation of any field of study.  Yet
there is always a danger that academic elites will stanch dissent and, thus, the
progress of genuine understanding in their field.  In this regard, a worthwhile
academic symposium should invite constructive debate, kind skepticism, and ro-
bust discussion of alternative viewpoints.   And by this measure, the first corpo-
rate governance symposium hosted by New York Law School’s Center on Business
Law & Policy was an unqualified success.
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